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was not substantial when balanced against 
the compelling interest of both the state 
and the defendant in the accurate disposi-
tion of a case. In Ake, the state argued 
that a requirement to provide a defendant 
with psychiatric assistance would result 
in a staggering burden. The Court re-
jected the argument that such a require-
ment would place an unbearable economic 
burden on the state, noting that the fed-
eral government and many states currently 
make psychiatric assistance available to 
indigent defendants and they have not 
found the economic burden too great so 
as to preclude psychiatric assistance. Fur-
thermore, the Court argued that this is 
particularly true when the obligation of 
the state is limited to providing only one 
competent psychiatrist. 
In applying the third factor-assessing 
the probable value of psychiatric assis-
tance and the risk of error if it is denied-
the Court determined that, when the state 
makes a defendant's mental condition 
relevant to his criminal culpability and 
subsequent punishment, the assistance of 
a psychiatrist may well be crucial to a 
proper defense. The Court found this 
proposition to be reflected in the fact that 
more than forty states have decided, either 
through legislation or judicial decision, 
that indigent defendants are entitled to 
the assistance of a psychiatrist under cer-
tain circumstances. (It is interesting to 
note that Maryland is not one of these 
forty states.) Additionally, the federal 
government has provided that indigent 
defendants shall receive the assistance of 
all experts "necessary for an adequate de-
fense." Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(e) (1970). Hence, "without the 
assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a 
professional examination on issues rele-
vant to the defense, to help determine 
whether the insanity defense is viable, to 
present testimony, and to assist in prepar-
ing the cross-examination of a State's psy-
chiatric witnesses," the Court concluded 
that "the risk of an inaccurate resolution 
ofinsanity issues is extremely high." Ake, 
104 S.Ct. at 1096. Moreover, the risk of 
error is particularly great when a defen-
dant's mental condition is seriously in 
question. Therefore, the Court decided 
that the need for the assistance of a p~­
chiatrist is readily apparent when a defen-
dant is able to make an ex parte threshold 
showing to the trial court that his sanity is 
likely to be an important factor in his de-
fense. As a result of this finding, the Court 
held that when a defendant demonstrates 
to the trial court that his sanity at the time 
of the offense is to be a significant factor 
at trial, the state "must, at a minimum, as-
sure the defendant access to a competent 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appro-
priate examination and assist in evalua-
tion, preparation, and presentation of the 
defense." Ake, 104 S.Ct. at 1097. The 
Court warns, however, that this does not 
mean that an indigent defendant has a 
constitutional right to choose a psychia-
trist of his personal liking or to receive 
funds to hire his own. Consequently, the 
Court left the determination of how to 
implement this right to the states. 
Finally, the Court held that if a state 
presents psychiatric evidence as to a de-
fendant's future dangerousness, the in-
digent defendant has an additional right 
to a psychiatrist's assistance at the sen-
tencing phase of his trial as well. If this 
were not true, a defendant could not offer 
a well-informed expert's opposing view 
and he would thereby lose an important 
opportunity to raise questions in the 
jurors' minds regarding the state's proof of 
an aggravating factor. Thus, the Court 
decided that at capital sentencing pro-
ceedings, "where the consequence of error 
is so great, the relevance of responsive 
psychiatric testimony so evident, and the 
burden on the state so slim, due process 
requires access to psychiatric examination 
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the 
psychiatrist, and to assistance in prepara-
tion at the sentencing phase." Ake, 104 
S.Ct. at 1097. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Ake ar-
guing that the Court's holding should be 
limited to capital cases. Additionally, the 
dissent argued that it should be made 
clear that the entitlement is to an inde-
pendent psychiatric evaluation and not to 
a defense consultant. 
- Jenmfer Hammond 
Evans v. Evans: EXPANDING 
VISITATION RIGHTS 
Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a trial court is autho-
rized to award visitation rights to the non-
adoptive stepmother of a minor child. 
Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 
157 (1985). This decision reversed an un-
published opinion by the Court of Special 
Appeals, and concluded that a 1981 amend-
ment to the statute granting equity courts 
jurisdiction over the custody and visitation 
of a child did not affect well established 
law authorizing the courts great discretion 
to award visitation, provided the best in-
terests of the child are served. 
Appellant and appellee were married in 
June of 1975. For six months prior to the 
marriage, the appellee's son by a previous 
marriage was under the care of the appel-
lant. The parties separated in January of 
1980, but Jason, then six years old, re-
mained under the appellant's care for 
seven months following the separation. In 
August of 1980, Jason went to live with his 
father. The parties filed cross-complaints 
for divorce and the appellant requested 
liberal visitation rights with Jason, which 
were granted by th~ Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County. 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals 
examined the 1981 amendment to section 
3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article of the Maryland Code, which 
confers upon the court the authority to 
consider petitions for visitation rights by 
grandparents of a child of divorced parents. 
The Court of Special Appeals concluded 
that the inclusion of this amendment was a 
reflection of the legislature's intent to limit 
the discretionary power of equity courts to 
determine who should be vested with child 
visitation rights. 
The Court of Appeals based its reversal 
on an exhaustive review of the relevant 
statutory and decisional law. It first con-
cluded that the granting of child visitation 
rights within a divorce decree was well 
established in Maryland, citing Prangle v. 
Prangle, 134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (1919). 
Although the specific statutory provi-
sions referred only to child "custody" and 
"guardianship," Prangle and subsequent 
decisions interpreted them to implicitly 
encompass visitation rights. See, Hild v. 
Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); 
Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 
614 (1929). Furthermore, the current stat-
utory scheme explicitly grants equity courts 
jurisdiction over child visitation rights. MD. 
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201 (a)(6) 
(1984). 
Secondly, the court traced the history of 
section 3-602, noting that when section 
3-602 was recodified in 1975 it deleted lan-
guage specifying those who could petition 
the court for child custody, (i.e. father, 
mother, relative, next of kin, next friend, 
or any public official). Following these de-
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letions, the statute read: "A court of equity 
has jurisdiction over the ... visitation ... 
of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the 
court may . . . (4) Determine who shall 
have visitation rights to a child;" MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 
3-602 (a) (1976). The court stated: "On its 
face, therefore, section 3-604 (a) (4), prior 
to the 1981 amendment, constituted the 
broadest possible grant of authority to 
courts to determine who shall be awarded 
visitation rights." Evans v. Evans, 302 
Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159. 
The court then addressed the appellee's 
contention that jurisdiction over visitation 
must be construed narrowly in view of the 
1981 amendment specifically providing 
for grandparent's visitation rights. The 
basis for the appellee's argument was that 
the inclusion of a statutory provision spe-
cifically addressed to the visitation rights 
of grandparents was a legislative recogni-
tion of the need to protect these rights. In 
rejecting their argument, the court of ap-
peals noted a long line of case law previ-
ously recognizing the right of grandparents 
to custody and visitation rights. Powers v. 
Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641 
(1938). 
The thrust of the court's reasoning, how-
ever, seems to turn on its examination of 
the legislative history of the 1981 amend-
ment to Section 3-602 (a) (4). A four year 
effort had been present in the Maryland 
Legislature to enact legislation to guarantee 
visitation rights to grandparents. Evans, 
302 Md. at 339-43, 408 A.2d at 159-61. 
However these measures were repeatedly 
defeated on the grounds that the existing 
law adequately provided these rights. 
The court agreed with the analysis of a 
1984 decision by the court of appeals, 
Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480 
A.2d 820(1984), wherein that court stated: 
"The legislative history contains no indi-
cation that the bill was intended as a limi-
tation on grandparental visitation or on 
anyone else's visitation - in other con-
texts ... " Id at 60-61, 480 A.2d at 826. 
The court's decision in Evans reaffirms 
the longstanding test which has governed 
Maryland custody and visitation cases, 
namely, what is in the best interests of the 
child. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51,475 
A.2d 1180 (1984); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 
349,157 A.2d442 (1960); Carterv. Carter, 
156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929). Evans 
makes it clear that the Maryland courts 
have considerable discretion in determin-
ing who shall be awarded child visitation 
rights, and explicitly are not limited to nat-
ural or adoptive parents or grandparents. 
-M. Tracy Neuhauser 
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u.s. v. Johns: THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION ONE STEP FURTHER 
The Supreme Court through Justice 
O'Connor in a 7-2 decision extended the 
rule of law of United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798 (1982), which stated that once 
police officers have probable cause to 
search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they 
may open and search closed containers 
found within the vehicle that may conceal 
the object of their search. In United States 
v. Johns, 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985), the Su-
preme Court held that a search is not un-
reasonable, and therefore not violative of 
the fourth amendment, "merely" because 
the warrantless search of closed containers 
takes place several days after the contain-
ers are removed from the vehicles. 
In the course of an investigation of drug 
smuggling operations, custom agents by 
airborne and surface surveillance observed 
the rendezvous between several pickup 
trucks and an airplane at a remote airstrip 
50 miles from the Mexican border. At 
trial the surface agents stated that they 
could not see what transpired, but were 
told by airborne units that the trucks ap-
proached and parked near the small plane. 
The officers closed in on the trucks, ob-
served an individual covering the contain-
ers with a blanket, and smelled the odor 
of marihuana. In the back of the trucks 
were containers wrapped in dark green 
plastic and sealed with tape. The respon-
dents were then arrested. Neither the con-
tainers nor the trucks were searched at the 
scene but instead they were taken to the 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
headquarters. The containers were un-
loaded from the trucks and placed in a 
DEA warehouse; three days later a war-
rantless search revealed the marihuana. 
At trial the respondents were successful 
in suppressing the evidence, and this was 
affirmed by the court of appeals, United 
States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
The Court summarily disposed of the 
respondents first contention that the offi-
cer's probable cause to suspect contraband 
went to the containers not the vehicles. 
This distinction is important; if probable 
cause went to the containers, the rule in 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977), would invalidate the warrantless 
search as outside of the automobile excep-
tion first set forth in Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but if the 
probable cause went to the vehicle, the· 
only issue is whether the rule in Ross, 
should apply to a three day delay in an 
otherwise lawful search. The Court did 
not disturb the findings of fact of the 
lower court and agreed that the officers 
had probable cause that not only the pack-
ages, but also the vehicle contained the 
drugs. See United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 
1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1983). 
The Court appeared to break the case 
into two steps. First, that Ross, allowed 
police officers to open and search closed 
containers found in the execution of a 
warrantless automobile search. Second, 
that Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 
(1970), allowed vehicle searches at the po-
lice station that could have taken place at 
the place of the vehicle stop. Therefore, 
the Court simply stated, "as the Govern-
ment was entitled to seize the packages 
and could have searched them immedi-
ately without a warrant, we conclude that 
the warrantless search three days later ... 
was reasonable .... " Johns, 105 S.Ct. at 
887. 
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